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The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s Inflation Target: A Phillips Curve Analysis
Abstract
This study attempts to analyze Canada’s inflation target with a specific focus on determining the
unemployment cost of their inflation target. It is hypothesized that Canada’s move towards decreased
inflation results in an unemployment cost that potentially outstrips the benefits associated with price
stability.
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The Unemployment Cost of Canada’s
Inflation Target: A Phillips Curve
Analysis
Robbie Gallagher

I. INTRODUCTION
performance. More specifically, this paper aims to
n February of 1988, Canada announced
explore the effects of inflation targeting in Canada
its radical new approach to monetary
on unemployment by testing the validity of the expolicy - the push towards zero inflation.
pectations-augmented Phillips curve.
Three years later, it became just the second nation
Keynesian macroeconomic theory asserts
worldwide to institute a formalized inflation-targeting
that decreased inflation results in increased unemregime (Meyer, 2000). Since New Zealand (1990)
ployment in the short-run. On the contrary, adapand Canada (1991) implemented inflation targets, the
tive expectations and rational expectations theorists
global landscape has transformed into a collage of
contend that a stringent commitment to decreased
inflation curbs expectations thus negating the potennations instituting similar inflation targeting regimes.
From Spain to Finland
tial increase in unemand from the United Kingployment (Abel,
dom to Australia, each
2001). Hence, the
“Since
New
Zealand
(1990)
and
nation seeks to curb what
ability to build a credCanada (1991) implemented inflation
ible inflation target
many dub the “demon” of
targets,
the
global
landscape
has
macroeconomic policy.
results in long-run
stability and an elimiIn 1988, John
transformed into a collage of nations
nation of the Phillips
Crow, the Governor of
instituting similar inflation targeting
the Bank of Canada,
curve inflation-unemregimes.”
sought to tame inflation in
ployment tradeoff.
Canada. His goal was
The prospect of increasing
unemployment
looms
large
for inflation-tarsimple: push towards absolute price stability now and
reap the long-run rewards of economic growth and
geting regimes, such as Canada. If inflation targets
welfare gains later (Johnson, 1997). Crow offered a
cause unemployment to spiral upwards out of control, then perhaps these targets are not the means to
three-stage argument in support of targeting goals for
Canadian monetary policy. He contends that a push
tame inflation. Contrarily, if Canada can reach the
long-run without suffering tremendous unemployment
towards zero inflation will: equalize expected and actual inflation, thus improving economic performance,
hikes, then perhaps inflation targets are the answer.
This study attempts to analyze Canada’s inflation
stabilize economic costs due to ‘fragile’ expectations,
and smooth ‘fragile’ inflation expectations (Johnson,
target with a specific focus on determining the un1997). This study will focus on Crow’s first asseremployment cost of their inflation target. I hypothesize that Canada’s move towards decreased inflation; that inflation targeting equalizes expected and
tion results in an unemployment cost that potentially
actual inflation measures, thus improving economic
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outstrips the benefits associated with price stability.
Section II explores previous research on inflation targets and credibility while Section III focuses on the Phillips curve, adaptive expectations
theory, and the rational expectations theory. Section IV contains my formalized empirical model.
Section V describes the data, Section VI offers results, and Section VII draws conclusions and investigates potential policy implications.

menting an inflation target in Canada and the potential ramifications of such a policy.
Alesina and Summers (1993) pioneered the
relevant literature researching the benefits associated
with inflation targets. Specifically, Alesina and Summers offer insights into the correlations between central bank independence and the rates of unemployment, inflation, and real GDP growth. They employ
scatter plot diagrams to depict these correlations.
Essentially, Alesina and Summers show that central
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
bank independence is negatively related to inflation
Two main bodies of literature dominate this
rates within a nation. Hence, as central bank domiresearch study. I first present the relevant literature
nance moves upward, inflation rates tend to trickle
on inflation targets followed by the relevant literadownward. Furthermore, they demonstrate that
ture on announcement credibility.
greater central bank independence, and hence lower
inflation, does not have any effect on the real variA. Inflation Targets
ables within their model. This includes the unemInflation targeting is a relatively new pheployment rate along with real GDP growth. This sugnomenon stemming back to the late 1980s. Hence,
gests that greater central bank independence leads
much of the literature available is still in its infancy
to greater credibility. Their model builds directly on
stage. Nonetheless, a significant amount of past
the indices used by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman
work delves into inflation targets, either directly or
et al. (1993), who all reach a similar conclusion; that
indirectly. Svensson (1997) explores the optimal
real variable changes need not accompany disinflation.
inflation target among conservative central banks
Cornwall and Cornwall (1998), however, challenge
while McMahon (2000)
the notion that greater cenexplores the consetral bank independence, and
quences of inflation targets
hence lower inflation rates,
“. . .as central bank dominance
while maintaining a specific
have no effect on real varimoves
upward,
inflation
rates
focus on developing counables in the economy. They
tend to trickle downward.”
tries seeking to initiate
suggest that changing the
greater fiscal and monetary
nature of a central bank, in
discipline. Of particular
and of itself, does not lower
importance in this study, however, are the works of
inflation without cost. Furthermore, they contend that
Alesina and Summers (1993), Cornwall and
unemployment rates deviate in response to differences
Cornwall (1998), and Fortin (2003). Much of the
between actual and expected inflation rates.
early literature focused on the connections between
Cornwall and Cornwall (1998) model the
increased central bank independence and low inflacosts and benefits associated with central bank indetion. Hence, these early studies provide the initial
pendence. To accomplish this, they employ an exframework for determining the relationship between
pectations-augmented Phillips curve to illustrate how
inflation targets and unemployment costs. Later
greater central bank independence costs an economy
studies, such as Fortin’s, investigate, with specific
in terms of unemployment. Ultimately, Cornwall and
regard to Canada, the effects that an inflation target
Cornwall conclude that a shift towards greater cenmay have. Significantly lacking from this body of
tral bank independence, contrary to previous findliterature, however, is an empirical analysis that foings, results in greater unemployment. Thus, Cornwall
cuses directly on the unemployment costs of impleand Cornwall indirectly find support for the notion
49
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that inflation targets (movements towards disinflation)
result in costs, namely in terms of unemployment.
Pierre Fortin (2003) takes the notion of central bank independence and extends it to Canada.
Fortin argues using descriptive data that Canada’s
implementation of an inflation target is detrimental to
the economy. Specifically, he asserts that the largely
independent Bank of Canada instituted an inflation
target without regard for the economic costs. Central bank independence reduces the policy adjustment
time of an economy largely due to the ability of the
bank to work as its own separate entity. Greater
integration of banks and governments indicates a
slower transition period, as coordination often becomes an issue. By laying out the Phillips curve framework, Fortin describes theoretically how inflation targets are likely to cause unemployment rates to swell
inordinately high. However, this analysis is deficient
in the respect that he ignores any empirical tests to
measure the real magnitude of costs associated with
inflation targets.
B. Credibility Issues
Numerous studies explore the effect of credibility on inflation target announcements, and hence
the prospects for a long-run vertical Phillips curve
relationship. Eliasson (2001) targets Australia, Sweden, and the United States in an attempt to determine
whether it is appropriate to assume linearity in the
short-run Phillips curve. Johnson (1990), on the other
hand, analyzes the potential effects of inflation targets
in Canada with a focus on the importance of attaining
credibility. Similarly, Dodge (2002) focuses on the
Canadian experience, but instead takes a backward
looking approach to analyze the actual effects that
establishing a credible anchor for inflation targets had
in Canada. However, of particular importance to
this study are the works of Koustas (1998) and
Johnson (1997).
Koustas (1998) builds on the empirical model
set forth by King and Watson (1992) to test the validity of three long-run propositions with specific regard to Canada. Theoretically, Koustas draws on
the rational expectations theory developed by Lucas.
In his study, Koustas explores the reasoning that per-

manent changes in nominal variables have no longrun effect on real variables. Specifically, he tests for
long-run money neutrality, the vertical long-run
Phillips curve, and the long-run Fisher relationship.
His second empirical test is most relevant for this
study. Drawing on data from Canada, Koustas constructs a bivariate vector to estimate his regression.
He initially hypothesizes that the vertical long-run
Phillips curve does not exist in Canada. His study
finds support for this notion. Koustas’ study provides a great deal of insight into the proposition that
Canada has not yet reached the long-run where the
Phillips relation disappears. However, the model
seems somewhat deficient, as it does not concretely
attack the expectations-augmented Phillips curve relationship. He uses a set of bivariate regressions to
reach his conclusions. Theory suggests that the longrun Phillips curve is vertical resulting from expected
inflation falling into line with actual inflation.
Johnson (1997), on the other hand, concentrates on the specific nature of three policy announcements in Canada to signal the implementation of inflation targets. He reasons that only credible policy announcements have any effect on expected inflation and hence the prospects for a longrun vertical Phillips curve. Thus, Johnson hypothesizes that credible announcements on inflation targets will put downward pressure on expected inflation. If the announcements follow other credible
announcements, Johnson suggests that this magnifies the usefulness of the policy announcements,
possibly to the point where expected inflation actually falls in line with actual inflation levels. To test
this hypothesis, Johnson sets up a model where expected inflation serves as his dependent variable.
He then includes inflation lagged, a recent forecast
difference variable, a variable to capture the difference between U.S. and Canadian interest rates, the
nominal bank rate over the past year, and a dummy
variable to represent specific policy announcements.
Johnson uses this last variable, the dummy variable,
to estimate the effect that certain policy announcements had on expected inflation in Canada. His
study provides support for the notion that the announcements in Canada decreased expected infla-
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tion. This study will take Johnson’s analysis onestep further. Johnson models expected inflation to
flush out the relationship between announcements
and expected inflation. This study uses a similar
method to determine expected inflation, but places
the Canadian experience into an expectations-augmented Phillips curve relationship in order to get at
the unemployment effects of Canada’s inflation target. Furthermore, this study looks solely at the initial policy announcement in Canada. I do this in
order to determine the potential effect that Canada’s
initial policy announcement, a zero inflation target
(i.e. absolute price stability), had on expectations.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned previously, this study will focus on John Crow’s assertion that inflation targets
equalize expected and actual inflation thus improving economic conditions (Johnson, 1997). Adaptive expectations and rational expectations aid in explaining the change in expected inflation over time
and hence the proposition of the long-run expectations-augmented Phillips curve. However, the
Phillips curve relationship, which I present first, gets
at the short-run effects of the difference between
expected inflation and actual inflation on unemployment.
A. Phillips Curve
Developed in 1958 by A.W. Phillips, the
Phillips curve originally proposed an inverse relationship between the rate of wage inflation and the
rate of unemployment in the United Kingdom between 1861 and 1957, as shown by Figure 1
(Hoover 2002). Two years later, in 1960, Paul
Samuelson and Robert Solow replicated Phillips’
study using data spanning 1900 to 1960 in the United
States (Blanchard, 2003). With the exception of
the turbulent depression era, Samuelson and Solow’s
results supported Phillips’ in that a negative relation
exists between unemployment and inflation. By the
1970s, however, this relationship seemingly broke
apart thus leading to the development of the expectations-augmented curve, which accounts for expected inflation. Hence, the Phillips curve relation51

ship posits that inflation depends on expected inflation, cyclical unemployment, and supply shocks, as
depicted below (Abel, 2001):
π = πe – α(υ − υn) + ε

where ð equals inflation, πe equals expected inflation,
υ − υn equals cyclical unemployment, and å equals the
error term, or more specifically, supply shocks that
disrupt cycle behavior.
Based on the theories of adaptive expectations and rational expectations, which I present next,
people form their expectations based on the recently
observed past and, on average, are correct in their
expectations. Expected inflation, in the Phillips curve
relationship, assumes past levels of actual inflation
determine present expected inflation. Hence, expected inflation in this model is a backward looking
variable, which depends on the assumption of adaptive expectations. By similar reasoning, expected inflation, which depends on the credibility of announcements, is a forward-looking variable. Hence, expected inflation, for any given year, depends on both
backward and forward-looking variables in conjunction with supply shocks, which serve to disrupt normal cycle behavior. The next part of the Phillips relation captures cyclical unemployment, or alternatively,
the deviation of actual unemployment from the natural level of unemployment. The á represents a positive number that measures the strength of the relationship between unanticipated inflation and cyclical
unemployment. Hence, as actual unemployment
moves further from the natural level of unemployment, inflation trends downward. As unemployment,
or the deviation of actual from the natural rate, increases, inflation decreases. Similarly, as inflation
hikes upward, unemployment levels shrink.
B. Adaptive Expectations
The adaptive expectations theory stems from
the notion that individuals develop forecasts of future
inflation based on past actual levels of inflation rates,
adjusted for their own past expectations. Essentially,
adaptive expectations indicate that people base their
expectations in the future based on what occurred in
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the past. For example, this “backward looking” theory
suggests that if inflation was high in the past, people
would tend to believe it will be high in the future (Ruby,
2003).
Adaptive expectations gained popularity in the
1980s, as a means to explain a significant amount of
the crises that pervaded much of the world after the
oil shocks of the 1970s (Adaptive, 2002). Following
the oil shocks in the 1970s, many nations experienced
sustained high levels of inflation. For some nations,
this sustained inflation extended well into the 1990s.
Adaptive expectations sought to explain these sustained levels of inflation solely on the basis of the past.
The oil shocks in the 1970s caused inflation to spike
upwards. The continued effect of these shocks created a situation where inflation levels remained high
for some number of years. With continued high levels
of inflation year after year, individuals within those
nations began to expect high levels of inflation in the
future. Adaptive expectations theorists contend that
the best indication of the future is the past. Individuals in the 1970s, recognizing that past inflation levels
were inordinately high, came to expect that future levels
would be just as high (Adaptive, 2002). Hence, individuals adapt their expectations over time due to past
indications about the economy (Abel, 2001).
As mentioned, adaptive expectations is particularly useful to explain one portion of expected inflation within the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve. Based on adaptive expectations, expected
inflation, or πe, is a function of previous levels of inflation. Hence, πe is appropriately written as πet-1 and
πe t-2. Generally, adaptive expectations account for
two periods, assuming that what the first lag fails to
pick up, the second lag does. On occassion, expected inflation includes a third lag, most likely a lag
of one year, in order to pick up what the other two
lags fail to pick up. While actual inflation last year is
the most accurate indicator for actual inflation this year,
the inflation level from two years ago has some effect,
though this effect diminishes the further back in time
you go. Hence, an extremely low inflation level two
years ago will serve to curb expectations for the future to some degree given that last year’s actual inflation level was significantly inflated.

C. Rational Expectations
Throughout the 1960s, several economists
suggested that humans were able to adapt to their
environment, and hence to economic conditions over
time. Robert Lucas formalized this notion in 1972
(Ruby, 2003). Rational expectations, as Lucas
coined it, essentially assumes that the beliefs of
workers and firms are correct, on average. Developed as a response to apparent flaws in adaptive
expectations theory, rational expectations seeks to
explain how individuals, given constantly rising inflation, could come to rationally infer governmental
policy (Rational, 2003). Essentially, “rational expectations” means that the expected price is chosen
in such a way that, given shocks within the economy,
sometimes the observed price is higher than the expected price and sometimes it is lower than the expected price. However, on average, people are correct in their expectations. Deviations from actual
levels are possible, but as soon as this occurs,
people’s expectations change to fall back in line.
This suggests that beliefs depend on the course pursued by policy makers over time. In other words,
the rational expectations theory predicts that people
are forward-looking. According to the rational expectations theory, as soon as a government changes
policy openly, people will change their expectations
to offset any economic distortions, assuming, however, that the open policy announcements are credible. As Figure 1 demonstrates, rational expectations predict a shift from point A to point C under
credible, open policy announcement scenarios. This
represents the long-run Phillips curve, labeled line
Y*. Essentially, the shift from point A to point C
indicates that the aggregate supply at Y* is vertical,
as it immediately shifts from point A to point C and
theoretically skips point B. If people do not have
rational expectations, then with a shift in aggregate
2
demand to AD equilibrium halts at point B in Figure 1, at least for some amount of time. If rational
expectations do not exist, then the economy may
rest at point B for some significant amount of time.
Eventually, as time progressed, the economy would
move from point B to point C, the new equilibrium.
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FIGURE 1
Rational Expectations
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Thus, according to rational expectations, if
the government seeks to implement policy changes in
order to affect the overall workings of the economy,
the only way to accomplish this is through unanticipated alterations. Essentially, this indicates that a surprise policy is necessary to hurdle consumer expectations. However, according to the rational expectations theory put forth by Lucas, the government cannot surprise the general public. Public forecasts, on
average, fall in line with actual policy guidelines. This
explains how a nation, despite policy changes, can
end up at the long-run Phillips curve.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
The empirical model utilizes two regressions:
the first captures expected inflation based on both
adaptive expectations and rational expectations while
the second incorporates that measure of expected
inflation into a Phillips curve relationship.
A. Expected Inflation
Based on adaptive expectations and rational
expectations, expected inflation takes the following
form:
πe = β1+ β2πt-1 + β3π t-2 + β5Announce + β6US + ε
where πe equals expected inflation, πt-1 equals actual
inflation lagged one period, π t-2 equals actual inflation
53

lagged two periods, Announce is a dummy variable
representing the initial policy announcement, and US
represents a supply shock variable.
This equation indicates that expected inflation depends on certain adaptive expectations variables and a rational expectations variable, along with
supply shocks. Each of the actual inflation lagged
variables represents adaptive expectations variables,
as they are backward looking components. The
announcement dummy represents a rational expectation variable, as the effect of the policy announcement occurs in the future and hence, people adjust
their expectations in a forward-looking manner. The
supply shock variable attempts to account for any
abnormal disruptions in the Canadian economy due
to the United States economy.
As previously described, adaptive expectations contend that expected inflation is a function
of past inflation levels. Several methods can adequately capture this. By far, the most simplistic
way is to lag actual inflation one year. This indicates
that expected inflation depends solely on the level
of last year’s inflation. However, using one year as
a proxy for expected inflation is insufficient because
it completely ignores that inflation levels beyond one
year ago have an impact on expectations. Hence,
this model uses a two-year lag, assuming that two
years is sufficient to capture the effect that past inflation levels have on current expectations. What
the first lag variable fails to account for, the second
lag should pick up. Based on theory, I hypothesize
that each of the lagged variables carries a positive
sign.
In accordance with rational expectations is
the announcement variable, which aims to capture
the effect that the initial announcement in Canada in
February of 1988 had on expected inflation levels.
Theoretically, as time goes on, the announcement
becomes more credible or it completely loses credibility. In order to decipher between the policy effects and the sole effect of the announcement, I include a measure of supply shocks as a variable,
which I explain later. The announcement dummy
accounts for the singular effect of that particular announcement on expected inflation over time. If the
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announcement carries no effect at all, this variable
will be insignificant. Theoretically, announcing an
intended policy aim will have some effect, possibly
a large effect, on expectations. If, as is the case in
Canada, the announcement declares an intended
target of zero inflation, then expectations, on the sole
basis of this policy announcement, may change.
Given that the policy announcement is for zero inflation, I hypothesize that this variable carries a negative sign. If the announcement carries any weight at
all, then naturally people are going to believe the
central bank and hence lower their expectations of
what inflation will be in the future.
As previously mentioned, I include a measure of supply shocks to capture the effect that actual policy changes might have on expected inflation. This variable incorporates the Canadian producer price, along with the United States’ producer
price index for all goods. The Canadian economy,
no doubt, depends significantly on the United States
economy to provide raw inputs, as well as other
significant economic support. This leads to the assumption that the Canadian economy moves in conjunction with the United States’ economy. Specifically, this variable attempts to capture supply shocks
within the Canadian economy. In order to do this, I
subtract the Canadian producer price index from
the U.S. producer price index. I then subtract this
figure from the Canadian exchange rate. Essentially,
the difference between the United States’ producer
price index and Canadian producer price index indicates a discrepancy between prices. Since Canadian firms depend on the U.S. market to supply
vast amounts of raw inputs for manufacturing and
other industries, any difference between the two
values indicates a potential supply-side shock for
the Canadian economy. Furthermore, it is essential
to compare this value with the exchange rate for
Canada in order to account for any changes in the
value of money caused by exchange rate fluctuations, which could amplify or decrease any differences found between the U.S. producer price index
and the Canadian producer price index. If the percentage change in the exchange rate is equal to the
difference between the percentage change in the

United States producer price index and the Canadian producer price index, then there are no supply
shocks. The inclusion of this variable is essential to
capture any supply shocks that might disrupt normal
cycle behavior. Since Canadian firms depend on
U.S. inputs, I believe this represents a good proxy to
get at potential supply shocks within the economy
and I hypothesize that it shares a positive relationship
with expected inflation. Table 1 presents each variable, a short description of each, and their predicted
signs.
B. Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve postulates that inflation and
unemployment share an inverse relationship represented as the following:
π – πe = α(υ – υn) + ε

where π equals inflation, πe equals expected inflation
, υ – υn equals cyclical unemployment, and ε equals
the error term, or more specifically, supply shocks
that disrupt normal cycle behavior. By manipulating
the above equation, I obtain regression number two.
The following depicts the transformation:
(1) π – πe = α(υ – υn) + ε
(2) π = πe – α(υ – υn) + ε
(3) π + α(υ – υn) = πe + ε
(4) α(υ – υn) = πe – π + ε
(5) υ – υn = 1/ α (πe – π) + ε/α
(6) υ =1/α (πe – π) + ε/α

Equation (6) assumes that the natural rate of
unemployment is zero, in order to get at the effects
that a deviation of expected inflation from actual inflation has on the unemployment rate. From equation (6), I formulate regression model 2 as follows:
υ = α1 + α2(πe – π) + ε

where υ equals unemployment and (πe – π) equals
expected inflation obtained from Model 1 minus actual inflation, and ε represents the error term.
This regression equation incorporates a measure of the difference between expected inflation and
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TABLE 1
Variable De s criptions and Pre dicte d Effe cts
Variable

Name

De s cription

Pre dicte d Effe ct

pe

Expected Inflation

Expected inflation as a function of the
following variables.

pt-1

Actual Inflation One- Year Lag

CPI measure from one year ago.

+

pt-2

Actual Inflation Two- Year Lag

CPI measure from two years ago.

+

Announce

Announcement Dummy

Before February 1988 = 0, After
February 1988 = 1

-

US

Supply Shocks

Difference between U.S. and Canadian
PPI, adjusted for exchange rate

+

NOTE: Predicted Effect predicts the effect of an increase in each variable on the dependant variable.

actual inflation, as obtained in Model 1. Assuming
that I adequately account for supply shocks in Model
1, this model predicts that the difference between
expected and actual inflation accounts for the variation in unemployment. If expected inflation falls in
line with actual inflation, then we have the long-run
Phillips relation. This model suggests one hypothesis: The difference between expected inflation and
actual inflation carries a positive sign. As the devia-

tion between expected inflation and actual inflation
shoots upwards, the unemployment rate increases.
Essentially, the deviation between expected values
of inflation and actual values of inflation is what drives
the Phillips curve relationship in the short-run. The
greater the difference between the two, the greater
the unemployment costs. Table 2 presents the variables, variable descriptions, and predicted signs.

TABLE 2
Variable De s criptions and Pre dicte d Effe cts
Variable

Name

De s cription

u

Unemployment Rate

Unemployment Rate (as a percentage)

(pe - p)

Inflation

Deviation between expected inflation
and actual inflation

NOTE: Predicted Effect predicts the effect of an increase in each variable on the dependant variable.
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V. DATA
The data used in these two models comes
from Source OECD, an Internet database that houses
economic statistics for nearly every nation around the
world dating back to 1960. I use monthly data stemming from June 1973 to December 2002. I do this to
provide an adequate balance of data both before and
after the February 1988 zero inflation policy announcement in Canada. Source OECD provides all three
variable sets including unemployment rates, CPI values, and PPI values. I convert the CPI values into
inflation levels, as a percentage, by calculating the increase in CPI from year to year.
Throughout the post-announcement period,
the Canadian inflation rate has fluctuated quite dramatically. Immediately following the announcement,
inflation tailed upwards, which goes contrary to what
theory suggests. However, I postulate that this occurred due to the uncertainty surrounding the inflation
target at the time and due in large part to the fact that
Canada did not actually institute their inflation target
until 1991. Following 1991 and even for a short time
before 1991, inflation rates trended downwards in
Canada, which is in accord with what theory suggests. Furthermore, the unemployment rate within
Canada spanning this period shows a relatively stable
path of between 7 percent and 11 percent. Figure 2
depicts the relationship between the inflation rate and
the unemployment rate in Canada, beginning in 1988.
As Figure 2 clearly shows, inflation rates within
Canada fluctuate quite drastically throughout the period, ranging anywhere from just over five percent in
1989 to nearly a zero inflation rate in 1994. Of particular importance to this study, however, are not the
absolute values of the unemployment rate or the inflation rate, but rather the relationship between the two
rates.
Following the initial announcement of a zero
inflation target by Canada in February 1988, the country experienced a sharp increase in inflation that moved
from roughly three and a half percent in 1988 to just
over five percent in 1989. However, beginning in
1991, Canada’s inflation rate began to steadily decline, eventually reaching a low in 1994 at just over
zero percent inflation for the year. Following 1994,

the inflation rate picked up somewhat and currently
hovers somewhere between one and four percent.
These inflation trends are not surprising, however.
Canada did not actually institute their inflation-targeting regime until 1991, which might explain the
jump in inflation from 1988 until 1991. Following
1991, inflation rates declined and, on the whole, are
considerably lower than in years prior to 1988. This
suggests that the inflation target is working to curb
inflation rates within the country. Unemployment
rates in Canada follow a different pattern than inflation rates, but show an overall decline throughout
the period. Specifically, immediately following the
announcement in 1988, unemployment rates dipped
slightly only to rise and peak at just over eleven percent in 1993. From 1993 on, unemployment rates
show a constant decline, indicating that perhaps the
credibility of Canada’s announcement is creating a
situation where expected inflation is slowly falling in
line with actual inflation. In other words, this suggests increasing credibility over time.
Comparing these trends in inflation and unemployment, it is apparent that perhaps an unemployment-inflation tradeoff does exist in Canada following the initial announcement in 1988. From 1991
until 2002, inflation rates remained low, on the average, while unemployment rates remained relatively
constant, with a slight decline from year to year, which
suggests increasing credibility. Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that inflation targets quite possibly result in
unemployment costs, as indicated by the jump in
unemployment and the associated drop in inflation
beginning in 1991. Furthermore, Figure 2 demonstrates the possibility that the Bank of Canada is
slowly gaining credibility with their inflation target
announcements. This suggests, as indicated by the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, that Canada
is slowly reaching the long-run stage where expected
inflation falls in line with actual inflation. If this is
indeed the case, then the unemployment costs of
Canada’s inflation target are diminishing over time.
This is essentially John Crow’s long run utopia of
price stability and minimal unemployment costs.
Based solely on the trends in inflation and unemployment over time, however, it appears as though

The Park Place Economist, Volume XII

56

Robbie Gallagher

6

12

5

10

4

8

3

6

2

4

1

2

0

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

INFLATION RATE

FIGURE 2
Post-Announcement Trends

0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
YEAR
Inflation Rate

the inflation target set forth by John Crow created
significant unemployment costs initially, as unemployment rates shot up from nearly seven percent to just
over eleven percent. My empirical analysis supports
this notion.
VI. RESULTS
Both models use ordinary least squares
(OLS). I first present results for Model 1, the expected inflation model. Subsequently, I present results for Model 2, which aims to test the validity of
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve with respect to Canada.
A. Expected Inflation
As mentioned, I use OLS to approximate the
empirical model. I present the results of Model 1 in
Table 3.
Model 1 incorporates two adaptive expectations variables, a rational expectations variable, and
a supply shock variable. As a whole, Model 1 accounts for 32.7% of the variation in expected inflation, according to the R2 value. Furthermore, all of
the coefficients within the model have the expected
sign and proper magnitudes. Moreover, each of these
variables is highly significant. In particular, πt-1, or
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actual inflation lagged one period, demonstrates a
positive relationship with expected inflation, as it
should. A one percent increase in actual inflation
lagged one year indicates a .111 percent increase in
expected inflation this year. This figure falls within
an acceptable range, as the effect of a one percent
increase in actual inflation lagged one year should
not have more than a one percent increase effect on
actual inflation this year. Furthermore, this effect
should be above zero. Hence, since this coefficient
is between zero and one, it is within the acceptable
range. Actual inflation lagged one year, πt-1, is significant to the .05 level. This demonstrates a highly
significant relationship.
Similar to actual inflation lagged one year,
actual inflation lagged two years, or πt-2, is highly
significant. This particular variable is significant to
the .01 level, meaning it is slightly more significant.
The coefficient indicates that a one percent increase
in actual inflation lagged two years results in a 0.146
percentage increase in actual inflation this year. In
accord with actual inflation lagged one year, this coefficient must fall between zero and one. Hence, it
is within the acceptable range. The worrisome aspect of this coefficient, however, is that it is higher
than actual inflation lagged one year, which goes
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against theory. Theory suggests that the level of inan acceptable magnitude. Supply shocks, or events
flation one period ago has a larger effect than inflathat disrupt the normal workings of the economy,
tion from two periods ago on this year’s inflation.
should theoretically increase expected inflation. AsThe results suggest that inflation from two periods
suming that the variable used to represent supply
ago has the larger effect. Though this goes against
shocks provides an adequate proxy this coefficient
theory, perhaps my use of monthly data provides an
predicts what theory suggests.
adequate explanation. Perhaps if I had used yearly
data, then this would hold true because people have
B. Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve
more time to adjust. Nonetheless, this coefficient is
As mentioned, I use OLS to approximate
highly significant and falls within the acceptable range.
the empirical model. I present the results of Model 2
The announcement dummy coefficient sugin Table 4.
gests that the announcement effect decreases exModel 2 attempts to test the validity of the
pected inflation by 0.001782 percent. Hence, there
expectations-augmented Phillips curve with respect
is some credibility associated with Canada’s initial
to Canada following their initial zero inflation target.
zero inflation announcement. If the announcement
As a whole, this model accounts for 2.1% of the
lacked all credibility, then I would expect this coefvariation in unemployment, according the adjusted
ficient to equal zero. Theoretically, if the announceR2 value. Though this value appears excessively low,
it is nonetheless acceptable. This model does not
ment carried no credibility then it would have no
attempt to control for any other variables. A large
effect on expected inflation. This coefficient falls
multitude of variables afwithin an acceptable range,
fects unemployment rates.
but the small coefficient
TABLE 3
In order to test the validsuggests that the credibilRe gre s s ion Re s ults for Expe cte d Inflation
ity of the expectationsity of the announcement is
augmented Phillips curve,
minimal. The announceVariable s
M ode l 1
however, I exclude these
ment dummy is significant
ceteris paribus variables.
to the .001 level, thus indi.
0
0
2
8
1
8
*
*
*
The Phillips curve framecating that it is highly sigConstant
(4.988)
work suggests that unemnificant.
ployment and inflation
The supply shock
.111*
pt-1
share an inverse relationcoefficient is also highly sig(2.114)
ship. As applied to an exnificant. It is significant to
.
1
4
6
*
*
pectations-augmented
the .001 level, as well. This
pt-2
(2.773)
framework, the larger the
coefficient suggests that a
difference between exone percent deviation in the
- . 0 0 17 8 2 * * *
Announce
pected inflation and actual
difference between the
(- 3.505)
inflation, the larger the unUnited States’ PPI and the
employment cost. ThereCanadian PPI adjusted
. 0 15 2 4 * * *
U
S
fore, despite the disapusing the Canadian ex(4.204)
pointing adjusted R 2
change rate results in a
2
=
.
3
2
7
n
=
3
5
4
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
R
value, the model does
0.01524 percent increase
what it sets out to do.
in expected inflation. * indicates significance to .05 level
Hence, this R2 value, takAlong with all other vari- ** indicates significance to .01 level
ing into account that I exables in this model, this co- *** indicates significance to .001 level
clude all ceteris paribus
efficient carries the ex- NOTE: t- statistic appears in parentheses.
variables, is appropriate.
pected sign and falls within
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TABLE 4
Re gre s s ion Re s ults for Une mployme nt
Variable s

M ode l 2

Constant

.08687**
(87.846)

(pe - p)

.836*
(2.924)

Adjusted R2 = .021

n = 354

* indicates significance to .01 level
** indicates significance to .001 level
NOTES: t- statistic appears in parentheses.

Perhaps even more important than the R2 value,
however, is that the coefficient associated with the
deviation between expected inflation and actual inflation carries the correct sign and is highly significant.
Model 2 predicts that a one percent increase
in the deviation between expected and actual inflation results in a .836 percent increase in the unemployment rate. This falls within an acceptable range.
The farther away expectations are from actual values of inflation, the higher are the associated unemployment costs, according to theory. Hence, this
value should be small with minor deviations and large
with significant deviations. As it stands, a 0.836
percent increase in the unemployment rate is reasonable. The coefficient is significant to the .01 level,
meaning that it is highly significant. Though this model
has little predicting power in terms of an R2 value,
the correct signs and high significance values indicate it is a good predictor. Since the aim is to test
the validity of the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve, these results have significant meaning and successfully predict what theory suggests.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study persuasively supports the notion
that inflation targets result in unemployment costs,
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which are possibly significant in magnitude. Undoubtedly, moves towards disinflation, such as an inflation
target, result in higher unemployment levels. The
Phillips curve predicts this relationship and my results also support this notion. Perhaps the most significant conclusion of this study, therefore, is that instituting inflation targets can result in unemployment
costs. The deviation between expected inflation and
actual inflation magnifies these costs. If expected inflation is five percentage points higher than actual inflation as compared to only one percent higher, then
surely this indicates a more significant unemployment
cost. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that announcement credibility is crucial to successfully implementing an inflation target, as hinted at by previous
research on the topic. A credible announcement, theoretically, should decrease expected inflation possibly
to the point where expected inflation falls in line with
actual inflation. This study supports the notion that
announcements can alter expected inflation.
Hence, with specific regard to the Canadian
situation, my results suggest that they have yet to reach
the long-run, where expected inflation falls in line with
actual inflation and the unemployment costs disappear. Initially, this is what John Crow hoped for –
suffer the consequences of disinflation policy in the
short-run and reap the rewards of long-run growth
and welfare increases as expected inflation falls in
line with actual inflation due to credibility over time.
Unfortunately, for Canada, expected inflation and actual inflation have yet to equalize meaning that the
unemployment costs of their inflation target will continue to accumulate. These findings suggest that inflation targets may not be the answer to taming inflation due to the potentially excessive unemployment
costs. Canada instituted their inflation target nearly
sixteen years ago and has yet to reach the long-run
utopia that John Crow dreamed of. The unemployment costs of implementing this policy continue to
grow. Perhaps the length of Canada’s “short-run” in
regards to this inflation target suggests that the costs
of such a policy outweigh the benefits associated with
price stability.
The conclusions set forth above suggest possible policy implications. First, if inflation targets are
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to work without unemployment costs, then announcement credibility is of utmost importance. If a nation
seeks to implement a target and aims to avoid the
subsequent increase in unemployment, then they must
strive to build credibility before instituting such a policy.
If announcement credibility is such that expected inflation falls in line with actual inflation then disinflation
through an inflation target is possible without the unemployment costs experienced by Canada. Furthermore, another policy implication is that inflation targets may not be the best way to attack inflation. The
results of this study support the notion that the unemployment costs of inflation targets are significant and
hence nations should seek to implement policies other
than inflation targets, unless they can build credibility
such that expected inflation falls in line with actual inflation. Canada’s inability to reach John Crow’s long
run utopia after nearly sixteen years provides convincing evidence to support this notion.
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